In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_report_tgtpgs()
The following issue was observed running syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831
Read of size 2132 at addr ffff8880aea95dc8 by task syz-executor.0/9815
CPU: 0 PID: 9815 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.202-00874-gfc0fe04215a9 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xe4/0x14a lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x73/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352 [inline]
kasan_report+0x272/0x370 mm/kasan/report.c:410
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302
memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline]
sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831
fill_from_dev_buffer+0x14f/0x340 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1021
resp_report_tgtpgs+0x5aa/0x770 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1772
schedule_resp+0x464/0x12f0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:4429
scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x467/0x1390 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5835
scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x3fc/0x9b0 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1896
scsi_request_fn+0x1042/0x1810 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:2034
__blk_run_queue_uncond block/blk-core.c:464 [inline]
__blk_run_queue+0x1a4/0x380 block/blk-core.c:484
blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1c2/0x2d0 block/blk-exec.c:78
sg_common_write.isra.19+0xd74/0x1dc0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:847
sg_write.part.23+0x6e0/0xd00 drivers/scsi/sg.c:716
sg_write+0x64/0xa0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:622
__vfs_write+0xed/0x690 fs/read_write.c:485
kill_bdev:block_device:00000000e138492c
vfs_write+0x184/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:549
ksys_write+0x107/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599
do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x560 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
We get 'alen' from command its type is int. If userspace passes a large
length we will get a negative 'alen'.
Switch n, alen, and rlen to u32.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.1 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-27). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it