In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtw88: Fix array overrun in rtw_get_tx_power_params()
Using a kernel with the Undefined Behaviour Sanity Checker (UBSAN) enabled, the
following array overrun is logged:
================================================================================
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /home/finger/wireless-drivers-next/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/phy.c:1789:34
index 5 is out of range for type 'u8 [5]'
CPU: 2 PID: 84 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: G O 5.12.0-rc5-00086-gd88bba47038e-dirty #651
Hardware name: TOSHIBA TECRA A50-A/TECRA A50-A, BIOS Version 4.50 09/29/2014
Workqueue: phy0 ieee80211_scan_work [mac80211]
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x64/0x7c
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x43/0x48
rtw_get_tx_power_params+0x83a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/0xad0 [rtw_core]
? rtw_pci_read16+0x20/0x20 [rtw_pci]
? check_hw_ready+0x50/0x90 [rtw_core]
rtw_phy_get_tx_power_index+0x4d/0xd0 [rtw_core]
rtw_phy_set_tx_power_level+0xee/0x1b0 [rtw_core]
rtw_set_channel+0xab/0x110 [rtw_core]
rtw_ops_config+0x87/0xc0 [rtw_core]
ieee80211_hw_config+0x9d/0x130 [mac80211]
ieee80211_scan_state_set_channel+0x81/0x170 [mac80211]
ieee80211_scan_work+0x19f/0x2a0 [mac80211]
process_one_work+0x1dd/0x3a0
worker_thread+0x49/0x330
? rescuer_thread+0x3a0/0x3a0
kthread+0x134/0x150
? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
================================================================================
The statement where an array is being overrun is shown in the following snippet:
if (rate <= DESC_RATE11M)
tx_power = pwr_idx_2g->cck_base[group];
else
====> tx_power = pwr_idx_2g->bw40_base[group];
The associated arrays are defined in main.h as follows:
struct rtw_2g_txpwr_idx {
u8 cck_base[6];
u8 bw40_base[5];
struct rtw_2g_1s_pwr_idx_diff ht_1s_diff;
struct rtw_2g_ns_pwr_idx_diff ht_2s_diff;
struct rtw_2g_ns_pwr_idx_diff ht_3s_diff;
struct rtw_2g_ns_pwr_idx_diff ht_4s_diff;
};
The problem arises because the value of group is 5 for channel 14. The trivial
increase in the dimension of bw40_base fails as this struct must match the layout of
efuse. The fix is to add the rate as an argument to rtw_get_channel_group() and set
the group for channel 14 to 4 if rate <= DESC_RATE11M.
This patch fixes commit fa6dfe6bff24 ("rtw88: resolve order of tx power setting routines")
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-28). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it