In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in load_balance()
Syzbot reported a handful of occurrences where an sd->nr_balance_failed can
grow to much higher values than one would expect.
A successful load_balance() resets it to 0; a failed one increments
it. Once it gets to sd->cache_nice_tries + 3, this *should* trigger an
active balance, which will either set it to sd->cache_nice_tries+1 or reset
it to 0. However, in case the to-be-active-balanced task is not allowed to
run on env->dst_cpu, then the increment is done without any further
modification.
This could then be repeated ad nauseam, and would explain the absurdly high
values reported by syzbot (86, 149). VincentG noted there is value in
letting sd->cache_nice_tries grow, so the shift itself should be
fixed. That means preventing:
"""
If the value of the right operand is negative or is greater than or equal
to the width of the promoted left operand, the behavior is undefined.
"""
Thus we need to cap the shift exponent to
BITS_PER_TYPE(typeof(lefthand)) - 1.
I had a look around for other similar cases via coccinelle:
@expr@
position pos;
expression E1;
expression E2;
@@
(
E1 >> E2@pos
|
E1 >> E2@pos
)
@cst depends on expr@
position pos;
expression expr.E1;
constant cst;
@@
(
E1 >> cst@pos
|
E1 << cst@pos
)
@script:python depends on !cst@
pos << expr.pos;
exp << expr.E2;
@@
# Dirty hack to ignore constexpr
if exp.upper() != exp:
coccilib.report.print_report(pos[0], "Possible UB shift here")
The only other match in kernel/sched is rq_clock_thermal() which employs
sched_thermal_decay_shift, and that exponent is already capped to 10, so
that one is fine.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.7): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.7 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.7 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-28). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it